loyalist paramilitaries and their representatives in this era, many of whom would go on to have long careers in loyalist politics or community work in Northern Ireland. Despite this, British involvement in loyalist politics is entirely missing from all three of the (otherwise excellent) major academic studies into the recent history of loyalism (Bruce, 1994; Nelson, 1984 & Spencer, 2008 . Papers released by both the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), however, clearly demonstrate the importance attached to talking with loyalists following Labour's election victory in March 1974. They also demonstrate the early political ambitions of the loyalist paramilitaries as they emerged in the 1970s. While papers from Laneside occasionally hint at attempts being made to strengthen political loyalism against Ian Paisley's emergent DUP, this 'mainstreaming' of loyalist leaders was not the dominant feature of the talks that took place there. This paper will look first at the idea that Laneside was actively trying to mould and influence the emerging leaders of loyalism (a top down approach) before looking at how it was accepted that the loyalist leaders arrived at Laneside with pre-determined aims and intentions, and in fact proved difficult to influence (a bottom-up approach). Finally the paper will look at the aims and ambitions of those who worked at Laneside in an attempt to look at what went on there from the middle (the perspective of the talks themselves). In doing so the article demonstrates that, despite having no defined objective, Laneside nevertheless had a function in allowing the paramilitaries to vocalise their political ideas and ambitions and that those who attended talks there demonstrated a longer-term tendency toward politicising themselves away from the use of violence.
A good example of this long term tendency can be found in a 1979 photo essay in the Observer Magazine on prominent loyalists entitled 'At home with the UDA.' (Observer Magazine, 16 December 1979) . Three of the ten men featured (Andy Tyrie, Glen Barr and t.craig@staffs.ac.uk From the perspective of British policy in Northern Ireland, this article demonstrates that Laneside was being used in support of the public political process evinced by the Sunningdale Communiqué (that initiated a power-sharing executive) and the later Constitutional Convention. Despite the seeming contradiction in holding separate discussions with unelected paramilitary groups, Laneside, though it had little authority, used its influence at this time to implement the stated policy of the UK government. Laneside's role was to support the establishment of sustainable political institutions in Northern Ireland whatever the main political parties there decided upon. Such political institutions required a stable peace which, it had become apparent, could not be imposed by the simple removal or internment of Northern Ireland's gunmen. Laneside was therefore involved in the pacification of paramilitary groups by encouraging them to organise political parties, listening to their viewpoints and explaining the benefits of the government's position.
Laneside was not the site of political collusion that later did so much damage to relations between HMG and the nationalist community, though nor was it the murky lair of Britain's secret officials bypassing the democratic structures of Northern Ireland to some great unknown end that another recent work has labelled it (Ramsay, 2009: 85) .
From the historiographical perspective the notion that loyalist paramilitary groups had ambitions beyond local defence in the 1970s is a controversial one. Only Sarah Nelson's 1984 work ever really examined these ambitions thoroughly but was later criticised for taking these views too seriously. Steve Bruce wrote that 'Nelson ... makes the mistake of giving more attention to the political thinking of some UVF leaders than the UVF gave' and he dismisses the relevance of the Volunteer Political Party (VPP) by describing it out of hand as simply 'a curious animal' (Bruce, 1994: 99 '[Menachem Begin] banked on the fact that the massive disruptions caused to daily life and commerce by the harsh and repressive countermeasures that the British were forced to take would further alienate the community from the government, thwart its efforts to obtain the community's cooperation against the terrorists, and create in the minds of the Jews an image of the army and the police as oppressors rather than protectors.' (Hoffman, 1998 Although not proscribed until the 1990s, the UDA was brought into talks in a similar way, through a willing elected representative, in their case Assembly member for Londonderry, Glen Barr (Whyte, 2009 'The UVF's relationship with us has become very strange. They are desperately in need of advice as to how to achieve their aims of ensuring working-class, and above all UVF, participation in politics and they seek this from us even though they know there are basic differences between them and HMG on the strike.' 9
Adding to this confusion over intentions, when the strike ended with UWC victory on 28
May, the UVF began in earnest to organise their own 'Volunteer Political Party' and they again went straight to Laneside to discuss their options. There they spoke first to James From the perspective of those that worked at Laneside, Barr was particularly well connected. He was a leading light in Vanguard, had been a vocal trade unionist and was active within the UWC; and as political advisor to the UDA he was a highly considered interlocutor at Laneside. From the bottom-up perspective however, Barr was there because Barr wanted to be there. He had his own views, and his entry and exit from so many political movements over the years demonstrates a clear ideological standpoint, rather than loyalty to any particular organisation. Barr's ideas on an independent Ulster -a minority view in both Vanguard and the UDA -typify a unique political approach that could be seen as selfindulgent. 13 But Barr's trade union experience made him an excellent figurehead and a key UDA strategist whether or not all his political ideas were fully accepted.
If Ken Gibson's talks at Laneside demonstrate evidence of a nervous, clientelistic attitude, then the UDA's talks there were often far more political and theoretical in content, though they achieved less from the perspective of the British government. For Glen Barr, ' We were interested in talking about a whole range of things, but politics was the main one'
(Interview with Glen Barr, 2010). Unlike the UVF, Barr believes that, 'we didn't go looking for advice, we came to discuss. We told them our opinions -my theme was independence' Catholics to participate in government and, while they rejected the idea of a United Ireland, they were happy to discuss a future in 'either a federal Britain or an independent dominion.' 14 On the 19 June, a second meeting with Tyrie and Barr focused on detention and again, unlike the UVF, they gave their opinions and philosophy and did not enter into negotiation of individual cases. Barr passed on a personal copy of the final statement of a loyalist conference he had attended earlier that day but James Allan told them that he 'did not wish to comment officially since it was not for us [Oatley was also present] to interfere.' 15 At a third meeting however on 21 June, Barr and Tyrie did begin to mention individual cases they were concerned with. These included rumours among the UDA in the Maze prison that their food was being poisoned, an enquiry into the potential of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) subsidising minibuses for visiting dependents of UDA prisoners, the imprisonment of Andy Beattie (who Barr contended 'was a goodie') and the personal matter of the extension of Barr's own gun licence (and the granting of one for Tyrie). 16 A month later, at another meeting at Laneside, patronage was back on the agenda. On his problems with the Unionist Party, Barr asked Allan 'Could not the British Government do something to finally discredit them?', while Tyrie asked that another of the UDA prisoners be released on compassionate grounds. As they were leaving Tyrie also made a request, 'with just a note of seriousness', that they be granted family holidays (though not to Cyprus) and for expenses to be paid for Barr's car as he'd managed to write-off two in the preceding months driving to and from meetings at Laneside. 17 For Barr, these personal requests were always unsuccessful. 'We got nothing from them ... we were telling them what was going on in the streets, and we were going in to better our communities, not to better ourselves and that was the thing with us. Our principles were maintained, and were non-negotiable' (Interview with Glen Barr, 2010). 21 In a separate instance, Brian Garrett, a solicitor and member of the NILP also acted as an intermediary with elements of the UWC (Fisk, 1975: 84 24 The aim of all talks however was the identification of moderates within organisations currently proscribed due to terrorist activity and de-proscription followed by a 'substantial release' of prisoners in order to 'strengthen those in the organisation who favoured political, non-violent policies and reduce the risk of proponents of violence asserting themselves.' 25 Of course this was only a discussion document at this stage and (upon his appointment) Merlyn Rees's statement that he would never speak to the IRA (again) (Daily Telegraph, 7 March 1974) was taken relatively seriously, even at Laneside. 26 The intense personal trust between Rees and Cooper however meant that the PUS always stood a chance of running a project without
Rees' scrutiny if needs required it. And, if not against the letter of Rees' statement of 7
March, talks with the loyalists were certainly against the spirit of what Rees spoke of.
From this perspective, the talks at Laneside were not calculated to bolster the unionist left wing. More it was an attempt at amelioration that would, it was hoped, allow for a natural centre-ground in these groups to be found. Secret talks at Laneside joined its public functions of entertaining the Press, holding social receptions for the elected elites of Northern Ireland, and meeting with peace and reconciliation groups. Talks with paramilitaries and their representatives (though seemingly incongruous) took place in this context, and thus they 'were not borne from any cast iron object or method ... we were not working to a particular agenda ... We weren't favouring any particular course' (Interview with James Allan, 2010). Diplomats were specifically chosen for their unique skills in conversation and for their amiability. James Allan recollects, 'they knew I could talk the hind leg off a donkey and something somewhere would emerge upon which their experts could get onto. My job was to be the listening post to everything and to report this accurately'
(Interview with James Allan, 2010). Allan's considered view of those he spoke to was pragmatic:
'I didn't personally attribute evil to the senior people I met in [any of] these organisations. That may have been my superficial attitude to evil, but I genuinely felt that I was just dealing with organisation men ... we weren't counting the bodies because we weren't at the hospitals ... Fein' he told them, 'had exploited the situation cleverly. They had mounted a powerful propaganda effort which appeared to have taken in many people (including, by implication, t.craig@staffs. In the end, the IRA ceasefire -which itself was pockmarked by serious instances of violence -was met by an increased loyalist paramilitary campaign which included some of these groups' most harrowing atrocities of the Troubles. The Volunteer Political Party, having achieved only 2,690 votes in the general election of October 1974 was wound up shortly after (Nelson, 1984: 187-188) when the UVF issued a new policy document that declared 'attack as the best means of defence' and calling on its activists to, 'employ the same tactics as our enemy, but [to] be more ruthless and determined' (Spencer, 2008: 62 (Rees, 1985: 231) and certainly the UWC were also vexed by Arlow's talk (Fisk, 1975: 247) . However, after their re- Though for a while the offices at Laneside continued to be used, talks with paramilitaries there became more consultative and prosaic after its cover was blown. In a series of meetings a week after the New Statesman article, the Convention Report, formulated by Northern Ireland's main political parties, was presented in turn to several groups at Laneside. These meetings were designed to establish where these groups stood on the key issues but had nothing of the openness and intimacy that the minutes from 1974 reveal. Andy Tyrie described to Middleton the feelings of virtual anomie among 'the people'.
He spoke openly and honestly, but 'showed no curiosity as to the government's position, and left his copy of the report on the Ireland.
